An étude in modeling the definability of equilibrium

Ariel Rubinstein and Kemal Yildiz
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Ariel Rubinstein: Tel Aviv University

Review of Economic Design, 2022, vol. 26, issue 4, No 2, 543-552

Abstract: Abstract We analyse the object assignment model enriched with a set of orderings over the set of agents. These orderings provide potential criteria for determining the suitability of agents to be assigned to an object. A candidate for a definable equilibrium is an assignment of the agents to the objects and an attachment of a single criterion to each object. In equilibrium, each agent is better-suited to his assigned object than any agent who envies him, according to the criterion attached to that object. We analyze the equilibrium notion and provide some examples.

Keywords: Definability; Definable equilibrium; Object assignment model (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C0 D0 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
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DOI: 10.1007/s10058-021-00267-2

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