Effects of Innovation Efficiency and Knowledge on Industry-University Collaboration: An Evolutionary Game Perspective

Yang Song and Zhiyuan Zhang
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Yang Song: Jilin University
Zhiyuan Zhang: Jilin University of Finance and Economics

A chapter in Collaborative Innovation Networks, 2019, pp 143-161 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract This paper studies the “evolutionarily stable strategy” (ESS) between industry and university during collaborative innovation processes based on evolutionary games. By designing knowledge sharing models, we analyze the impact factors of knowledge input, knowledge transfer, and innovation cost on collaborative innovation. Furthermore, we use simulation to verify the knowledge sharing model. Our results suggest that the “open innovation strategy” is actually the fact that players choose “evolutionarily stable strategy” in the long-term collaborative innovation process. When the number of game players is different, the small group takes the lead in achieving stabilization strategy. When the number of game players is similar, both groups adopt the “open strategy” at the same speed. Besides, we also suggest that increasing knowledge spillover will contribute to innovation efficiency and stabilization. Theoretically, our study explains the stabilization strategy of the game and provides reasonable recommendations for policy makers.

Date: 2019
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:seschp:978-3-030-17238-1_9

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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-030-17238-1_9

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