Descriptions of the Voting Methods to Be Analyzed

Dan S. Felsenthal () and Hannu Nurmi
Additional contact information
Dan S. Felsenthal: University of Haifa
Hannu Nurmi: University of Turku

Chapter Chapter 2 in Monotonicity Failures Afflicting Procedures for Electing a Single Candidate, 2017, pp 11-22 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract This chapter describes the 18 most well-known voting procedures for electing one out of several candidates. These procedures are divided into three groups: A group of five procedures that are vulnerable to non-monotonicity under both fixed and variable electorates: Plurality with Runoff, Alternative Vote, Coombs’ Method, Dodgson’s Method, Nanson’s Method. A group of eight procedures that are vulnerable to non-monotonicity under (only) variable electorates: Successive Elimination, Bucklin’s Method, Majority Judgment, Copeland’s Method, Black’s Method, Kemeny’s Method, Schwartz’s Method, Young’s Method. A group of five procedures that are invulnerable to any monotonicity failures: Plurality Voting, Approval Voting, Borda’s Count, Range Voting, the Minmax Method.

Keywords: Voting procedures; Voting methods; Voting rules; Monotonicity failures; Fixed electorates; Variable electorates (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:spbchp:978-3-319-51061-3_2

Ordering information: This item can be ordered from
http://www.springer.com/9783319510613

DOI: 10.1007/978-3-319-51061-3_2

Access Statistics for this chapter

More chapters in SpringerBriefs in Economics from Springer
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().