On Stackelberg–Nash Equilibria in Bilevel Optimization Games

Damien Bazin (), Ludovic Julien () and Olivier Musy
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Damien Bazin: Côte d’Azur University, CNRS, GREDEG

Chapter Chapter 2 in Bilevel Optimization, 2020, pp 27-51 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract Hierarchical games with strategic interactions such as the Stackelberg two-stage game epitomize a standard economic application of bilevel optimization problems. In this paper, we survey certain properties of multiple leader–follower noncooperative games, which enable the basic Stackelberg duopoly game to encompass a larger number of decision makers at each level. We focus notably on the existence, uniqueness and welfare properties of these multiple leader–follower games. We also study how this particular bilevel optimization game can be extended to a multi-level decision setting.

Keywords: Multiple leader–follower game; Stackelberg–Nash equilibrium (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
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Working Paper: On Stackelberg-Nash equilibria in bilevel optimization games (2021)
Working Paper: On Stackelberg-Nash equilibria in bilevel optimization games (2020)
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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-030-52119-6_2

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