Experimental Design Problems and Nash Equilibrium Solutions

Egidio D’Amato (), Elia Daniele () and Lina Mallozzi ()
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Egidio D’Amato: University of Naples Federico II
Elia Daniele: University of Naples Federico II
Lina Mallozzi: University of Naples Federico II

A chapter in Network Models in Economics and Finance, 2014, pp 1-12 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract In this paper we present a non-cooperative game theoretical model for the well-known problem of experimental design. Nash equilibrium solutions of a suitable game will be the optimal values of the design variables, given by the coordinates of points in a region in the spirit of the facility location model. Because of the dependency of the objective functions on the distance from the domain’s boundary, this problem has a strong analogy with the classical sphere packing problem. Theoretical and computational results are presented for this location problem by virtue of a genetic algorithm procedure for both two- and three-dimensional test cases.

Keywords: Nash Equilibrium; Location Problem; Nash Equilibrium Problem; Game Theoretical Model; Admissible Region (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:spochp:978-3-319-09683-4_1

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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-319-09683-4_1

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