Facility Location Situations and Related Games in Cooperation

Osman Palanci () and S. Zeynep Alparslan Gök ()
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Osman Palanci: Suleyman Demirel University
S. Zeynep Alparslan Gök: Suleyman Demirel University

A chapter in Spatial Interaction Models, 2017, pp 247-260 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract In this paper, we study some of classical results in facility location games. Shapley value and equal surplus sharing rules are considered. It is seen that these rules do not have a population monotonic allocation schemes (PMAS). Further, we introduce facility location interval games and their properties. Finally, we conclude this paper.

Keywords: Facility Location Games; Game Interval; Population Monotonic Allocation Schemes (PMAS); Shapley Value; Equal Division Solution (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:spochp:978-3-319-52654-6_11

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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-319-52654-6_11

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