Asymmetries in Competitive Location Models on the Line

H. A. Eiselt () and Vladimir Marianov ()
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H. A. Eiselt: University of New Brunswick
Vladimir Marianov: Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile

A chapter in Spatial Interaction Models, 2017, pp 105-128 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract This paper first presents a standard competitive duopoly location model on a linear market and derives an equilibrium solution as well as a solution for the sequential von Stackelberg game. The heart of the contribution then investigates scenarios, in which the duopolists face or follow asymmetric situations or strategies. In particular, we examine situations, in which the duopolists have different objectives, models, in which firms apply different pricing policies, and instances, in which the competitors have different capabilities.

Keywords: Comeptitive loaction; Hotelling; Nash equilibria; Von stacelberg solutions (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:spochp:978-3-319-52654-6_6

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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-319-52654-6_6

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