Equilibrium Analysis for Common-Pool Resources

Lina Mallozzi () and Roberta Messalli ()
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Lina Mallozzi: University of Naples Federico II
Roberta Messalli: University of Naples Federico II

A chapter in Dynamics of Disasters, 2018, pp 73-84 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract We present an aggregative normal form game to describe the investment decision making situation for a CPR: we will consider a non-cooperative approach searching a Nash equilibrium of it, as well as a cooperative one searching a fully cooperative equilibrium. An application in the Environmental Economics will be illustrated and, in this context, we will introduce a threshold investment as a random variable and we will study the resulting game with aggregative uncertainty looking for a Nash equilibrium and a fully cooperative equilibrium.

Keywords: Investment Threshold; Aggregate Uncertainty; Ordinal Potential Game; Aggregate Investment; Quadratic Payoff (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:spochp:978-3-319-97442-2_4

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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-319-97442-2_4

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