Game Equilibrium Models I

Edited by Reinhard Selten

in Springer Books from Springer

Date: 1991
ISBN: 978-3-662-02674-8
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Chapters in this book:

Introduction to the Series “Game Equilibrium Models”

Reinhard Selten

Introduction to Volume I: Evolution and Game Dynamics

Reinhard Selten

Game Theory and Population Dynamics in Complex Genetical Systems: The Role of Sex in Short Term and in Long Term Evolution

Ilan Eshel

Evolutionary Stability and Dynamic Stability in a Class of Evolutionary Normal Form Games

Franz J. Weissing

Anticipatory Learning in Two-Person Games

Reinhard Selten

The Origin of Isogamous Sexual Differentiation

Rolf F. Hoekstra, Yoh Iwasa and Franz J. Weissing

The Evolutionary Stability of Bluffing in a Class of Extensive Form Games

Roy Gardner and Molly Morris

Pollinator Foraging and Flower Competiton in a Game Equilibrium Model

Reinhard Selten and Avi Shmida

To trade, or not to trade; that is the question

James Friedman and Peter Hammerstein

Competition Avoidance in a Dragonfly Mating System

Hans J. Poethke and Franz J. Weissing

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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-662-02674-8

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