A Two-Timescale Stochastic Game Framework for Climate Change Policy Assessment

Alain Haurie

Chapter Chapter 10 in Dynamic Games: Theory and Applications, 2005, pp 193-211 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract In this paper we show how a multi-timescale hierarchical non-cooperative game paradigm can contribute to the development of integrated assessment models of climate change policies. We exploit the well recognized fact that the climate and economic Subsystems evolve at very different time scales. We formulate the international negotiation at the level of climate control as a piecewise deterministic stochastic game played in the “slow” time scale, whereas the economic adjustments in the different nations take place in a “faster” time scale. We show how the negotiations on emissions abatement can be represented in the slow time scale whereas the economic adjustments are represented in the fast time scale as solutions of general economic equilibrium models. We provide some indications on the integration of different classes of models that could be made, using an hierarchical game theoretic structure.

Keywords: Climate Policy; Dynamic Game; Stochastic Game; Economic Dynamic; Climate Change Policy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:sprchp:978-0-387-24602-4_10

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DOI: 10.1007/0-387-24602-9_10

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