Agency and Leadership in Cooperatives

Murray Fulton and Konstantinos Giannakas ()
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Murray Fulton: University of Saskatchewan

Chapter Chapter 6 in Vertical Markets and Cooperative Hierarchies, 2007, pp 93-113 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract The poor financial performance of a number of previously successful agricultural cooperatives appears to be connected to member commitment, which in turn is linked to the decisions made by the cooperatives’ leaders. While cooperative members should have an incentive to hire leaders that promote strong organizational commitment, the evidence suggests this incentive is weaker than imagined. This paper shows that cooperatives that believe they have a well-defined and loyal membership are less likely to hire leaders that will enhance member commitment. Thus, historical success is no guarantee of future success and may in fact contain the seeds of failure.

Keywords: Market Share; Organizational Commitment; True Type; Monetary Valuation; Dominant Logic (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007
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DOI: 10.1007/1-4020-5543-0_6

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