Cognitive Representation of Incomplete Knowledge

Gernot D. Kleiter
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Gernot D. Kleiter: Universität Salzburg, Institut für Psychologie

A chapter in Probability and Bayesian Statistics, 1987, pp 305-320 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract When asked for the meaning of subjective probability, Bayesian statisticians refer to concepts like confidence, feeling of uncertainty, incomplete knowledge, partial knowledge, or degrees of belief. Usually these concepts are taken as primitives, i.e. their meaning is not interpreted within a theory. Often subjective probabilities are “defined” by betting behavior. But such “definitions” are in the spirit of Bridgman’s operationalism and black box thinking. These paradigms were dominant around 1930 when the fundamentals of subjective probability theory were first developed by de Finetti.

Keywords: Knowledge Representation; Subjective Probability; Deductive System; Incomplete Knowledge; Representational Format (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1987
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DOI: 10.1007/978-1-4613-1885-9_32

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