Random Time Delays in Evolutionary Game Dynamics

Nesrine Ben Khalifa, Rachid El-Azouzi () and Yezekael Hayel
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Nesrine Ben Khalifa: University of Avignon Computer Science Laboratory (LIA), Computer Science Laboratory (LIA)
Rachid El-Azouzi: University of Avignon Computer Science Laboratory (LIA), Computer Science Laboratory (LIA)
Yezekael Hayel: University of Avignon Computer Science Laboratory (LIA), Computer Science Laboratory (LIA)

Chapter Chapter 4 in Multilevel Strategic Interaction Game Models for Complex Networks, 2019, pp 73-94 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract The majority of works in evolutionary dynamics have studied the replicator dynamics without taking into account the delay effects, assuming that the interactions have an immediate effect on the fitness of strategies. The expected payoff of a strategy is then considered as a function of the frequency of strategies in the population at the current moment.

Date: 2019
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:sprchp:978-3-030-24455-2_4

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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-030-24455-2_4

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