Traditional Approaches to Controlling Administrative CapacityAdministrative capacities

M. Ernita Joaquin and Thomas J. Greitens ()
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M. Ernita Joaquin: San Francisco State University
Thomas J. Greitens: Central Michigan University

Chapter Chapter 5 in American Administrative Capacity, 2021, pp 95-123 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract An overview of federal administrative history begins in this chapter and shows how initial ideas of administrative capacity were based on constitutional concerns about executive power. Such ideas were later shaped by successive trends in politics and continual tensions between the presidency and Congress. Due to the influence of politics and long-term debates between presidents and Congress in regard to which branch controlled federal administration, later reforms embraced the concept of a nonpartisan bureaucracy that helped build capacity. However, such capacity building also possessed political undertones and set the stage for late twentieth-century reforms that helped influence the decay and decline of administrative capacity recently witnessed.

Keywords: Energetic executive; Spoils system; Patronage; Pendleton Act; Reform; Brownlow Committee (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:sprchp:978-3-030-80564-7_5

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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-030-80564-7_5

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