Hostage-Taking, Ransom, and Negotiations

Satya P. Das
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Satya P. Das: University of South Florida

Chapter Chapter 12 in Economics of Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism Measures, 2022, pp 481-503 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract The hostage-taking behavior by terrorist groups is special in that the lives of people taken as hostages can be saved by the government in a short run, whereas in other forms of attacks, there is little scope to negotiate and potential to save people from death or injury while an incidence is in progress. Four types of hostage-taking missions are identified: kidnapping, taking over ground or water transportation, barricade missions, and skyjacking. The chapter explains the logic of a no-concession policy toward hostage takers by using a game tree. But its application in reality poses a painful trade-off between death or harm “hanging” before those already taken as hostages and future incidence of hostage-taking. Results from empirical studies on the determinants of various aspects of hostage-taking like the success or failure of concession policy, logistic success of capturing hostages, negotiation success, and safety of hostages are reviewed.

Date: 2022
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:sprchp:978-3-030-96577-8_12

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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-030-96577-8_12

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