Preemptive Strikes, Can We Win the War on Terror?

Satya P. Das
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Satya P. Das: University of South Florida

Chapter Chapter 9 in Economics of Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism Measures, 2022, pp 409-440 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract This chapter analyzes the economic mechanism behind how preemptionPreemption like militarily targeting terrorists and their bases works as a counter-terrorism measure Counter-terrorism measures . It degrades the capability of a terrorist organization in producing terror and, in a static framework, is introduced through a shift parameter in the marginal cost function facing a terrorist organization. In a dynamic framework, preemption Preemption is viewed in terms of an intertemporal budget constraint of a terrorist group. It is reasoned that controlling the flow of funds to a terrorist organization is also a preemptive measure, since, like military operations, it tends to weaken a terrorist organization’s capability to plan and execute terrorist attacks. The model enables us to frame the question of—and provide an answer to—“winning the war on terror.” An important insight/result is that a defending state cannot win the war on terror as long as its marginal cost of preemptive measures Preemptive measure(s), action(s), or strike(s) is increasing. The chapter also examines strategic interdependence among multiple target countries in terms of their choice of preemption and how cooperation can lead to a higher level of aggregate preemptive actions Preemptive measure(s), action(s), or strike(s) against a terrorist organization. Unlike security measures, military actions can cause collateral damage and invite a backlash. We analyze how backlash can undermine the effectiveness of preemptive measures. Preemptive measure(s), action(s), or strike(s)

Date: 2022
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:sprchp:978-3-030-96577-8_9

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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-030-96577-8_9

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