The Public Good Index for Games with Several Levels of Approval in the Input and Output

Sascha Kurz ()
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Sascha Kurz: University of Bayreuth

A chapter in Power and Responsibility, 2023, pp 257-269 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract The Public Good index is a power index for simple games introduced by Holler and later axiomatized by Holler and Packel so that some authors also speak of the Holler–Packel index. A generalization to the class of games with transferable utility was given by Holler and Li. Here, we generalize the underlying ideas to games with several levels of approval in the input and output—so-called (j, k) simple games. Corresponding axiomatizations are also provided.

Keywords: Public good index; Public good value; Simple games; TU games; Values; Axiomatization (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:sprchp:978-3-031-23015-8_14

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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-031-23015-8_14

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