Hybrids and Other Challenges in Organizational Economics

Claude Ménard ()
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Claude Ménard: Pantheon-Sorbonne University

Chapter 20 in Handbook of New Institutional Economics, 2025, pp 475-503 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract How can we explain the variety and resilience of non-standard arrangements through which agents organize the transactions that support their economic activities? This chapter proposes an extended and inclusive transaction cost framework that goes beyond the classic tradeoff between markets and hierarchies. Through the case of hybrid arrangements, this chapter argues that what differentiates hybrids and other organizational solutions are the allocation of rights in the organization of transactions and the constraints it imposes on their governance. Special attention is paid to the mechanisms implemented to face disturbances and unexpected events and, more generally, to the many challenges the diversity of organizational solutions poses to theory as well as policy-making.

Keywords: Institutions; Organizations; Hybrids; Transaction costs; Property rights; Decision rights; Governance; Contracts; Management (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:sprchp:978-3-031-50810-3_20

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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-031-50810-3_20

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