Spatial Models for Electoral Competition

Stefano Colombo ()
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Stefano Colombo: Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore

Chapter Chapter 7 in Spatial Economic Modelling, 2025, pp 123-129 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract In this chapter, I introduce the Downs model of electoral competition. The Downs model builds on the basic Hotelling model but considers citizens instead of consumers and political candidates instead of firms. The political preferences of the citizens and the political offer by the candidates are expressed by their location along the segment. Each candidate wants winning the election by receiving the majority of votes of the citizens. I characterize the tendency of the candidates to offer the policy which is liked by the median voter (“Median Voter Result”), and I then apply this result to the case of public good provision.

Date: 2025
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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-031-82787-7_7

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