Workplace Democracy and Job-Control Unionism in the United States

Michael W. Polisson ()
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Michael W. Polisson: Cornell University

A chapter in Workplace Democracy, 2026, pp 135-153 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract Although early debates in the United States on workplace democracy proposed many organizational forms, violent labor conflict led Congress to establish collective bargaining as the preferred means of resolving labor disputes. This industrial relations system, codified in the National Labor Relations Act of 1935, gave rise to job-control unionism—a form of industrial jurisprudence that carefully enumerates and fairly administers employment terms, but excludes entrepreneurial decisions from negotiation. This chapter’s analysis of job-control unionism and the New Deal industrial relations system yields two key insights. First, collective bargaining establishes the rule of law in the workplace, removing arbitrary, unaccountable managerial authority. Employees leverage the rules and regulations encoded in collective bargaining agreements to ensure the fair and consistent administration of public goods. Labor negotiations offer workers substantive voice in personnel policy. Yet, by excluding managerial practice and strategic decision-making from collective bargaining, the U.S. industrial relations system imposes strict boundaries on employee involvement. Second, organized labor seeks to standardize employment and workplace systems across an industry or occupation, in order to prevent market competition from lowering labor standards. Together, these themes provide a framework for understanding how collective bargaining both advances and constrains workplace democracy in the United States.

Keywords: Workplace democracy; Employee voice; Labor unions; Collective bargaining; Public goods; Occupational safety (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2026
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:sprchp:978-3-032-02774-0_6

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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-032-02774-0_6

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