 The Role of Advisors in AcquisitionsGonzalo Molina-Sieiro ()
A chapter in Navigating Stakeholder Dynamics Surrounding Acquisitions, 2026, pp 23-45 from Springer Abstract: Abstract Acquisitions are transformative corporate strategies, with financial and legal advisors playing a crucial role in deal structuring, valuation, and negotiation. However, the extent to which advisors enhance shareholder value remains contested. By reviewing the literature on M&A advisors, I outline their contributions and potential conflicts of interest in acquisition processes. While top-tier advisors can improve deal execution and post-merger performance, relational hazards and contingent fee structures may bias their recommendations. Information asymmetry and long-standing client relationships further complicate advisory incentives. Despite extensive study, gaps remain in understanding advisors’ long-term strategic impact, and emerging trends and questions are identified. The result is a roadmap for future research that emphasizes the need for longitudinal studies and governance mechanisms to ensure advisor incentives align with shareholder value. Keywords: Acquisition advisor; Conflict of interest; Target selection; Integration (search for similar items in EconPapers) There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it. Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:sprchp:978-3-032-03199-0_2 Ordering information: This item can be ordered from DOI: 10.1007/978-3-032-03199-0_2 Access Statistics for this chapter More chapters in Springer Books from Springer |
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