Crowdfunding and Moral Hazard Problems

Anton Miglo () and Victor Miglo
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Anton Miglo: Wilfrid Laurier University
Victor Miglo: CEM Benchmarking

Chapter 4 in The Theories and Developments of Crowdfunding, 2026, pp 95-110 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract Moral hazard refers to situations where the actions of managers/entrepreneurs are not observable and/or not verifiable by investors. Sometimes it is called the agency problem referring to a theoretical framework when one party (principal) hires another party (an agent) to perform some tasks and the interests of parties are not perfectly aligned.

Date: 2026
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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-032-10724-4_4

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