Finite noncooperative games

Nicolai N. Vorob’ev
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Nicolai N. Vorob’ev: Russian Academy of Sciences, St. Petersburg Institute for Economics and Mathematics

Chapter Chapter 2 in Foundations of Game Theory, 1994, pp 137-208 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract 1.1 Fundamental concepts and elementary properties. Let the noncooperative game 1.1 $$ \Gamma = \left\langle {I,\{ x_i \} _{i \in I} ,\{ H_i \} _{i \in I} } \right\rangle $$ be finite (see 1.3, Chapter 1). For each i ∈ I, we set $$ x_i = \{ x_i^{\text{1}} ,...,x_i^{mi} \} $$ . The system of numbers 〈m1, ..., m n 〉 is sometimes called the format (or the dimensions) of the game (1.1). Sometimes the strategies of player i will be identified with their indices 1,..., m i .

Keywords: Payoff Function; Mixed Strategy; Pure Strategy; Noncooperative Game; Equilibrium Situation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1994
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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-0348-8514-0_4

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