Induction and Intellection

William Briggs

Chapter Chapter 3 in Uncertainty, 2016, pp 27-37 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract There is no knowledge more certain than that provided by induction. Without induction, no argument could, as they say, get off the ground floor. All arguments must trace eventually back to some foundation. This foundational knowledge is first present in the senses; through intellection, i.e. induction, first principles, universals, and essences are discovered. Induction is what accounts for our being certain, after observing only a finite number of instances or even one and sometimes even none, that all flames are hot, that all men are mortal, that for all natural numbers x and y, if x = y, then y = x, and for providing content and characteristics of all other universals and axioms. Induction is analogical; it is of five different kinds, some more and some less reliable. That this multiplicity is generally unknown accounts for a great deal of the controversy over induction. Arguments are not valid because of their form but because of their content.

Keywords: Inductive Inference; Ground Floor; Substantial Form; Gettier Problem; Foundational Knowledge (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:sprchp:978-3-319-39756-6_3

Ordering information: This item can be ordered from
http://www.springer.com/9783319397566

DOI: 10.1007/978-3-319-39756-6_3

Access Statistics for this chapter

More chapters in Springer Books from Springer
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().