Cooperative Differential Games with Transferable Payoffs

Leon A. Petrosyan () and Georges Zaccour ()
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Leon A. Petrosyan: St Petersburg State University, Faculty of Applied Mathematics-Control Processes
Georges Zaccour: GERAD, HEC Montréal, Department of Decision Sciences

Chapter 13 in Handbook of Dynamic Game Theory, 2018, pp 595-632 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract In many instances, players find it individually and collectively rational to sign a long-term cooperative agreement. A major concern in such a setting is how to ensure that each player will abide by her commitment as time goes by. This will occur if each player still finds it individually rational at any intermediate instant of time to continue to implement her cooperative control rather than switch to a noncooperative control. If this condition is satisfied for all players, then we say that the agreement is time consistent. This chapter deals with the design of schemes that guarantee time consistency in deterministic differential games with transferable payoffs.

Keywords: Cooperative differential games; Time consistency; Strong time consistency; Imputation distribution procedure; Shapley value; Core (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-319-44374-4_12

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