Multistage Games

Jacek B. Krawczyk () and Vladimir Petkov ()
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Jacek B. Krawczyk: Victoria University of Wellington
Vladimir Petkov: Victoria University of Wellington

Chapter 4 in Handbook of Dynamic Game Theory, 2018, pp 157-213 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract In this chapter, we build on the concept of a repeated game Repeated game and introduce the notion of a multistage game Multistage game . In both types of games, several antagonistic agents interact with each other over time. The difference is that, in a multistage game, there is a dynamic system Dynamic system whose state keeps changing: the controls chosen by the agents in the current period affect the system’s future. In contrast with repeated games, the agents’ payoffs in multistage games depend directly on the state of this system. Examples of such settings range from a microeconomic dynamic model of a fish biomass exploited by several agents to a macroeconomic interaction between the government and the business sector. In some multistage games, physically different decision-makers engage in simultaneous-move competition. In others, agents execute their actions sequentially rather than simultaneously. We also study hierarchical games, where a leader moves ahead of a follower. The chapter concludes with an example of memory-based strategies that can support Pareto-efficient outcomes.

Keywords: Collusive Equilibrium; Discrete-Time Games; Feedback (Markovian) Equilibrium; Information Patterns; Open-Loop Nash Equilibrium; Sequential Games; Stackelberg Solutions (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-319-44374-4_3

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