Understanding Social Science Simulations: Distinguishing Two Categories of Simulations

Nicole J. Saam ()
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Nicole J. Saam: Institute of Sociology, Friedrich-Alexander Universität Erlangen-Nürnberg

A chapter in The Science and Art of Simulation I, 2017, pp 67-84 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract How can we understand the results of a simulation study? In this article, I address this epistemic question for social science simulations. I argue that we can distinguish two categories of simulations: simulations STE, which possess key features that resemble the epistemology and methodology of thought experiments, and simulations SE, which resemble the epistemology and methodology of experiments. Based on Woodward’s theory of causal explanation, I put forward the hypothesis that STE provide more understanding and a different kind of knowledge than SE because they give well-founded answers to what-if-things-had-been-different questions. Epistemic opacity is a persistent problem for simulations SE, while for STE it need not necessarily be so.

Keywords: Thought Experiment; Causal Explanation; Model Case; Scientific Understanding; Counterfactual Dependence (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:sprchp:978-3-319-55762-5_6

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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-319-55762-5_6

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