Successive Expansion and Stability of Network Integration in International Trade

Noritsugu Nakanishi

A chapter in International Trade and Economic Dynamics, 2009, pp 161-185 from Springer

Abstract: We construct a model of an international network integration formation game in which each country decides whether to join or exit from the existing international network integration and is assumed to be sufficiently farsighted to understand not only the immediate outcome of its own entry—exit but also the ultimate outcome resulting from the successive entry—exit by other countries. We demonstrate that there exists a unique farsighted stable set for this game that supports a Pareto-efficient network integration. In most cases, the worldwide network integration can be supported by the farsighted stable set.

Keywords: International Trade; Equilibrium Price; Business Service; Supply Function; Network Integration (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:sprchp:978-3-540-78676-4_15

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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-540-78676-4_15

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