Cost Allocation as Cooperative Games

Jens Leth Hougaard ()
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Jens Leth Hougaard: University of Copenhagen

Chapter 3 in An Introduction to Allocation Rules, 2009, pp 61-96 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract There is a wide range of situations where a group of agents (broadly interpreted as persons, departments, organizations or countries) benefit from cooperative actions, but is left with the problem of sharing the related costs. These situations range from everyday life problems such as people sharing a cab to international agreements like the Kyoto protocol where industrialized countries bargain over emission cuts. In everyday situations, like sharing a cab, there are rarely time to make use of sophisticated allocation rules even though the problem itself may be rather complex: typically the allocation becomes more or less random and people often tend to use rules of thumb.In situations like bargaining between countries over emission cuts, the final outcome will typically reflect the countries bargaining power rather than sophisticated considerations of fairness

Keywords: Allocation Problem; Cooperative Game; Cost Share; Allocation Rule; Coalition Structure (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:sprchp:978-3-642-01828-2_3

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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-642-01828-2_3

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