Smale Strategies for Prisoner’s Dilemma Type Games

Kashi Abhyankar

A chapter in Algebra, Arithmetic and Geometry with Applications, 2004, pp 45-48 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract The police arrest two suspects and question them in separate rooms. Each one is given the choice of confessing thus implicating the other, or keeping silent. The central feature of the story is that no matter what the other suspect does, each (considered alone) would be better off if he confessed. If the other confesses, the suspect in question ought to do the same and then avoid an especially harsh penalty for holding out. If the other remains silent, he can get especially lenient treatment for turning state’s witness. Confession is the dominant strategy. The irony is that both prisoners (considered together) would be better off if neither confessed — that is, if they cooperated — but since each is aware of the other’s incentive to confess, it is rational for both to confess.

Keywords: Nash Equilibrium; Game Theory; Harsh Penalty; Unique Nash Equilibrium; Interactive Decision (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:sprchp:978-3-642-18487-1_3

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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-642-18487-1_3

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