Supervisory Game Between Sci-Tech Bank and VC Firm

Xing-guo Gong () and Yu-hong Chen ()
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Xing-guo Gong: Yanshan University
Yu-hong Chen: Yanshan University

Chapter Chapter 29 in The 19th International Conference on Industrial Engineering and Engineering Management, 2013, pp 271-279 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract Facing the bottleneck phenomenon of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) that they are difficult to get the loan and guarantee, Science and Technology (Sci-Tech) bank offers bank debt and equity combination model to support SMEs, to some extent easing the financing difficulties. But technological innovation of SME is a multistage process. Due to the existence of regulatory costs after the initial investment, it will bring the competing relationship changes among the initial investors. Through the limited cooperation game, this paper studies the relationship between Sci-Tech bank and Venture Capital (VC) firm. The result shows Sci-Tech bank should choose the cooperation with VC firm, for ensuring the fund supply.

Keywords: Cooperation game; Sci-tech bank; SME; VC firm (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:sprchp:978-3-642-38427-1_29

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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-642-38427-1_29

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