Introduction to the Series “Game Equilibrium Models”

Reinhard Selten

A chapter in Game Equilibrium Models I, 1991, pp 1-2 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract Game equilibrium models are descriptions of interactive decision situations by game in extensive or normal form. The analysis of such models is based on the equilibriL point concept, often refined by additional requirements like subgame perfectness. Thseries consists of four volumes: I: Evolution and Game Dynamics II: Methods, Morals and Markets III: Strategic Bargaining IV: Social and Political Interaction.

Keywords: Evolutionary Game; Game Dynamics; Evolutionary Game Theory; Cooperative Game Theory; Subgame Perfectness (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1991
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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-662-02674-8_1

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