Ultimatum Games and Fuzzy Information

Philip Sander () and Peter Stahlecker ()
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Philip Sander: Universität Hamburg, Institut für Statistik und Ökonometrie
Peter Stahlecker: Universität Hamburg, Institut für Statistik und Ökonometrie

A chapter in Statistical Inference, Econometric Analysis and Matrix Algebra, 2009, pp 395-409 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract We consider the proposer's decision process in an ultimatum game where his uncertainty with respect to the responder's preferences and the associated acceptance threshold is modeled by a fuzzy set. Employing a three-step defuzzification strategy we determine the proposer's best possible claim which depends on his beliefs and his attitude towards risk. Furthermore, we derive an explicit solution for a specific class of fuzzy sets. From a more abstract point of view we analyze a game in which one player has a non-continuous objective function and where the uncertain point of discontinuity is determined by the other player's strategy.

Keywords: Membership Function; Ultimatum Game; Fuzzy Information; Dictator Game; Game Econ (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:sprchp:978-3-7908-2121-5_27

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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-7908-2121-5_27

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