Decision-Making Under Ignorance with Implications for Social Choice

Eric Maskin

A chapter in Game Theory, Social Choice and Ethics, 1979, pp 319-337 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract A new investigation is launched into the problem of decision-making in the face of ‘complete ignorance’, and linked to the problem of social choice. In the first section the author introduces a set of properties which might characterize a criterion for decision-making under complete ignorance. Two of these properties are novel: ‘independence of non-discriminating states’, and ‘weak pessimism’. The second section provides a new characterization of the so-called principle of insufficient reason. In the third part, lexicographic maximin and maximax criteria are characterized. Finally, the author’s results are linked to the problem of social choice.

Keywords: Social Choice; Collective Choice; Complete Ignorance; Unrestricted Domain; Social Alternative (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1979
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:sprchp:978-94-009-9532-1_9

Ordering information: This item can be ordered from
http://www.springer.com/9789400995321

DOI: 10.1007/978-94-009-9532-1_9

Access Statistics for this chapter

More chapters in Springer Books from Springer
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().