Blame Not the Laws of Nature

Joseph Agassi
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Joseph Agassi: York University, Department of Philosophy

A chapter in Topics in the Foundation of Statistics, 1997, pp 131-154 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract 1. Lies, Error and Confusion 2. Lies 3. The Demarcation of Science: Historical 4. The Demarcation of Science: Recent 5. Observed Regularities and Laws of Nature 1. What the public-relations spokespeople say is regularly in the gray area between ignorance, confusion and lies. 2. The integrity of science rests on precarious foundations. The traditional identification of science with proof, without any theory of proof to back it up, today simply harbors danger. 3. Only two rules, Boyle’s and Newton’s, are generally admitted as inherent to science. They functioned remarkably well, but present conditions require new measures. 4. Popper’s demarcation of science is partial: refutability is empirical character, and not every empirical research is scientific. 5. We do not know what in the life sustaining conditions is due to the laws of nature and what is due to mere local regularities.

Keywords: Scientific Theory; Paradigm Case; Empirical Success; Vienna Circle; Boston Study (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1997
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:sprchp:978-94-015-8816-4_14

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DOI: 10.1007/978-94-015-8816-4_14

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