Correction Mechanism of the Imbalance of Rural Long Tail Public Services

Ji Luo ()
Additional contact information
Ji Luo: Tsinghua University

Chapter Chapter 6 in Rural Long Tail Public Service and the Correction Mechanism, 2021, pp 205-236 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract Referring to the definition of mechanism design (Börgers and Krahmer in An introduction to the theory of mechanism design. Oxford University Press, USA, 2015), the design of the correction mechanism for the imbalance of rural long tail public services refers to choose the appropriate mechanism under the given economic and social environment, on the premise of not destroying the incentive motivation of all stakeholders (including individuals, governments and NGOs), so as to achieve the Pareto effect of social welfare and individual rational allocation results. In detail, this chapter includes basic mechanism design (basic setting, commitment mechanism, government regulation), incentive compatibility and information efficiency mechanism, interval design of imbalance correction mechanism, Groves-Clark correction mechanism, Nash equilibrium correction mechanism, dynamic adjustment mechanism and accurate matching mechanism.

Date: 2021
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:sprchp:978-981-16-4023-0_6

Ordering information: This item can be ordered from
http://www.springer.com/9789811640230

DOI: 10.1007/978-981-16-4023-0_6

Access Statistics for this chapter

More chapters in Springer Books from Springer
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().