Queueing Games with Priority

Jinting Wang ()
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Jinting Wang: Central University of Finance and Economics, School of Management Science and Engineering

Chapter Chapter 6 in Fundamentals of Queueing-Game Models, 2026, pp 109-152 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract Following Naor (1969) (1969), strategic customer behavior in queues has been studied in a large volume of literature with multiple dimensions, such as heterogeneous customers, reneging or retrial behavior, and delay information announcements.

Date: 2026
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DOI: 10.1007/978-981-95-0261-5_6

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