Watching Eyes and Reputation Anxiety: Why Not Try to Take the Lot?

Kayoko Kobayashi
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Kayoko Kobayashi: Nanzan University

Chapter Chapter 3 in The Mystery of the Ultimatum Game, 2025, pp 27-58 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract This chapter analyzes the decision-making process of the proposer in the ultimatum game, drawing on findings from the dictator game and other related studies, and examines our concerns regarding reputation.

Date: 2025
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:sprchp:978-981-97-8979-5_3

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DOI: 10.1007/978-981-97-8979-5_3

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