Extensive Decision Problems

Carlos Alós-Ferrer and Klaus Ritzberger

Chapter 4 in The Theory of Extensive Form Games, 2016, pp 67-97 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract This chapter introduces the first milestone in the development of a general theory of extensive form games—extensive decision problems (EDPs)—by adding to the objective description a subjective layer that specifies who can do what and when, under which constraints. It is shown that in an EDP every play can be selected by appropriate choices on the part of the players. The restrictions on the game tree are identified that arise if an EDP can be defined on the tree. This inquiry leads to important properties of game trees: weak up-discreteness, coherence, and regularity. In particular, the first property is sufficient for an EDP to be definable on the game tree.

Keywords: Pure Strategy; Terminal Node; Extensive Form; Differential Game; Perfect Information (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:spschp:978-3-662-49944-3_4

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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-662-49944-3_4

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