Uncertainty as Ambiguity: Ellsberg and the Paradoxes of Decision Theory

Carlo Zappia ()
Additional contact information
Carlo Zappia: University of Siena

Chapter Chapter 6 in Uncertainty in Economics, 2025, pp 109-132 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract This chapter presents the so-called paradoxes of choice proposed by Maurice Allais and Daniel Ellsberg to counter the dominant, Bayesian view established by Leonard Savage. The chapter places particular emphasis on Ellsberg’s introduction of the notion of ambiguity, a concept that proved crucial in creating a growing unease with respect to the dominant approach even among economists specializing in decision theory.

Date: 2025
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:spshcp:978-3-031-91221-4_6

Ordering information: This item can be ordered from
http://www.springer.com/9783031912214

DOI: 10.1007/978-3-031-91221-4_6

Access Statistics for this chapter

More chapters in Springer Studies in the History of Economic Thought from Springer
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().