Quantity and Price Competition in Static Oligopoly Models

Victor J. Tremblay and Carol Horton Tremblay
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Victor J. Tremblay: Oregon State University
Carol Horton Tremblay: Oregon State University

Chapter Chapter 10 in New Perspectives on Industrial Organization, 2012, pp 241-282 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract We saw in the previous chapter that there are two types of oligopoly models, those that assume cooperative behavior and those that assume noncooperative behavior. In Chaps. 10 and 11, we develop the classic models of oligopoly where firms behave noncooperatively. These models represent the most abstract material that is found in the book. Here you will see how some of the great figures in history have thought about the oligopoly problem.

Keywords: Nash Equilibrium; Price Competition; Inverse Demand Function; Strategic Substitute; Cournot Equilibrium (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
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DOI: 10.1007/978-1-4614-3241-8_10

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