Chapter 10: Fair Stakeholder Negotiations

Richard M. Robinson
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Richard M. Robinson: SUNY Fredonia

A chapter in Business Ethics: Kant, Virtue, and the Nexus of Duty, 2022, pp 179-204 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract Through compensation arrangements, corporate managers are typically bonded to the interests of shareholders. As a result, managers have a conflict-of-interest in paternalistically deciding the compensations to and opportunities for other non-owner stakeholders (employees, suppliers and some others). An appropriate normative stakeholder-theory should therefore center on notions of fair negotiations with these stakeholders where management openly acts as agents of the shareholders. These related management agreements should be viewed as resulting from fair bargaining. Consequently, an applicable set of Kantian derived rules for fair negotiations are posed here. Their appropriateness to both indirect market-based negotiation and to direct negotiation with stakeholders is examined.

Date: 2022
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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-030-85997-8_10

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