Standard Single-Unit Auctions

Asunción Mochón and Yago Sáez
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Asunción Mochón: UNED University
Yago Sáez: University Carlos III of Madrid

Chapter 2 in Understanding Auctions, 2015, pp 11-23 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract This chapter discusses the standard single-unit auctions: ascending (English), descending (Dutch), first-price sealed-bid, and second-price sealed-bid. Advantages, disadvantages, and distinguishing features of each format are described. Furthermore, equivalences among them are mentioned. The final section is devoted to the Revenue Equivalence Theorem, which states that, under certain assumptions, the four auction formats yield the same expected revenue to the seller. The implications of relaxing each assumption are also shown.

Keywords: Reserve Price; Bidding Strategy; Winning Bidder; Auction Format; Auction Model (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:sptchp:978-3-319-08813-6_2

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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-319-08813-6_2

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