Other Single-Unit Auctions

Asunción Mochón and Yago Sáez
Additional contact information
Asunción Mochón: UNED University
Yago Sáez: University Carlos III of Madrid

Chapter 3 in Understanding Auctions, 2015, pp 25-34 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract In the previous chapter, we studied the four standard single-unit auctions. However, the seller has multiple options when designing an auction. In this chapter, we examine other single-unit models, such as hybrid auctions (Anglo-Dutch and Dutch–English auctions), auctions with different pricing rules (third-price or average price), auctions with different closing rules, and all-pay auctions. The chapter ends with the definition of optimal and efficient auctions.

Keywords: Price Rule; English Auction; Auction Model; Optimal Auction; Dynamic Auction (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:sptchp:978-3-319-08813-6_3

Ordering information: This item can be ordered from
http://www.springer.com/9783319088136

DOI: 10.1007/978-3-319-08813-6_3

Access Statistics for this chapter

More chapters in Springer Texts in Business and Economics from Springer
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().