Combinatorial Auction Models

Asunción Mochón and Yago Sáez
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Asunción Mochón: UNED University
Yago Sáez: University Carlos III of Madrid

Chapter 8 in Understanding Auctions, 2015, pp 105-120 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract Combinatorial auctions (CAs) are characterized by offering multiple related items and allowing the bidders to bid for the items or combinations of items in which they are interested. When a combinatorial auction is being designed, the seller must set up all the details, such as: dynamic or sealed-bid (single-round), pricing rule, activity rule, and starting price. Given the wide spectrum of possibilities, in this chapter, we will only focus on analyzing a few of these models in which the first-price rule will be applied.

Keywords: Excess Demand; Combinatorial Auction; Activity Rule; Winning Bidder; Clock Phase (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-319-08813-6_8

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