Pure Strategy Nash Equilibrium and Simultaneous-Move Games with Complete Information

Felix Munoz-Garcia and Daniel Toro-Gonzalez
Additional contact information
Daniel Toro-Gonzalez: Universidad Tecnológica de Bolívar
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Daniel Toro González (dtgindorg@gmail.com)

Chapter Chapter 2 in Strategy and Game Theory, 2016, pp 25-60 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract Pure strategy Nash equilibrium (psNE) This chapter analyzes behavior in relatively simple strategic settings: Simultaneous-move games simultaneous-move games of complete informationComplete information . Let us define the two building blocks of this chapter: best responsesBest responses and Nash equilibrium Nash equilibrium.

Date: 2016
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
Chapter: Pure Strategy Nash Equilibrium and Simultaneous-Move Games with Complete Information (2019)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:sptchp:978-3-319-32963-5_2

Ordering information: This item can be ordered from
http://www.springer.com/9783319329635

DOI: 10.1007/978-3-319-32963-5_2

Access Statistics for this chapter

More chapters in Springer Texts in Business and Economics from Springer
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla (sonal.shukla@springer.com) and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing (indexing@springernature.com).