Simultaneous-Move Games with Incomplete Information

Felix Munoz-Garcia and Daniel Toro-Gonzalez
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Daniel Toro-Gonzalez: Universidad Tecnológica de Bolívar
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Daniel Toro González ()

Chapter Chapter 7 in Strategy and Game Theory, 2016, pp 217-236 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract This chapter introduces Incomplete Information incomplete information in simultaneous-move gamessimultaneous-move games , by allowing one player to be perfectly informed about some relevant characteristic, such as the state of market demand, or its production costs; while other players cannot observe this information. In this setting, we still identify players’ best responses, but we need to condition them on the available information that every player observes when formulating its optimal strategy. Once we find the (conditional) best responses for each player, we are able to describe the Nash equilibria arising under incomplete information (the so-called Bayesian Nash equilibria, BNEBayesian Nash equilibria (BNE) ) of the game; as the vector of strategies simultaneously satisfying all best responses.

Keywords: Simultaneous-move Game; Bayesian Nash Equilibrium; Students Attack; Simplified Poker; Best-response Function (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
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Chapter: Simultaneous-Move Games with Incomplete Information (2019)
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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-319-32963-5_7

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