Auctions

Felix Munoz-Garcia and Daniel Toro-Gonzalez
Additional contact information
Daniel Toro-Gonzalez: Universidad Tecnológica de Bolívar
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Daniel Toro González ()

Chapter Chapter 8 in Strategy and Game Theory, 2016, pp 237-255 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract In this chapter we examine different auction formats, such as first-, second-, third- and all-pay auctionsAll-pay auctions. AuctionsAuctions are a perfect setting in which to apply the Bayesian Nash Equilibrium (BNE) solution concept learned in Chap. 7 , since competing bidders are informed about their private valuation for the object but are commonly uninformed about each other’s valuations. Since, in addition, bidders are asked to simultaneously submit their bids under an Incomplete Information incomplete information environment; we can use BNE to identify equilibrium behavior, namely, equilibrium bidding strategies.

Date: 2016
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
Chapter: Auctions (2019)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:sptchp:978-3-319-32963-5_8

Ordering information: This item can be ordered from
http://www.springer.com/9783319329635

DOI: 10.1007/978-3-319-32963-5_8

Access Statistics for this chapter

More chapters in Springer Texts in Business and Economics from Springer
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().