Mechanism Design

Susheng Wang ()
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Susheng Wang: Hong Kong University of Science and Technology

Chapter Chapter 11 in Microeconomic Theory, 2018, pp 363-403 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract The previous chapter focuses on competitive markets under incomplete information. This chapter focuses on monopoly pricing under incomplete information. The basic modelling approach to monopoly pricing under incomplete information is the revelation principle, by which the uninformed strategically provide incentives for the informed to reveal their types.

Date: 2018
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DOI: 10.1007/978-981-13-0041-7_11

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