Imperfect Information Games

Susheng Wang (s.wang@ust.hk)
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Susheng Wang: Hong Kong University of Science and Technology

Chapter Chapter 7 in Microeconomic Theory, 2018, pp 209-269 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract In the last chapter, we saw that game theory is a powerful tool in dealing with the economic problems, especially when there are a small number of economic agents with conflicts of interest. Besides the issue of externalities, game theory is particularly useful for economic problems under imperfect and incomplete information.

Date: 2018
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DOI: 10.1007/978-981-13-0041-7_7

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